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The Water Is Coming: How Policies for Internally
Displaced Persons Can Shape the U.S. Response to
Sea Level Rise and the Redistribution of the
American Population
KELLY CARSON†
Roughly forty percent of the United States population lives in an area threatened to be underwater
by 2100 due to climate change. There are little to no infrastructural and policy frameworks to
handle this problem. This Note explores existing U.S. frameworks for disaster response—namely,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Small Business Administration (SBA),
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—as well as early-stage
initiatives to relocate entire communities within the United States. It then examines domestic and
international policies for handling internally displaced persons (IDPs), including the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the U.S. Agency for International
Development Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy and Implementation Guidelines,
and the Kampala Convention. The Note then suggests specific applications of these policy
frameworks to the issue of environmentally displaced persons (EDPs) in the United States, finding
that a more proactive approach including codified liability for private actors, economic incentives
for retreat, and a centralized agency to handle EDPs will provide the United States with a strong
foundation to handle the unique challenges facing the growing number of EDPs within its
borders.

† J.D. Candidate 2021, University of California, Hastings College of the Law Class; Senior Production
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. Special thank you to Professor David Takacs for his tireless commitment to his
students and to the environment. I am a better scholar for having worked with him. Further thanks to my
classmates at Hastings whose thoughtful reflections enriched the writing process for this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
Densely populated coastal areas susceptible to rising sea levels are home
to about forty percent of the U.S. population.1 As a result, scientists predict
massive population displacement of millions of Americans along the coasts in
the coming decades, with reverberating impacts on inland areas.2 The United
States is unprepared for this crisis. In fact, the effects of sea level rise have
already begun to permanently displace large numbers of Americans from their
homes,3 disproportionally affecting indigenous communities.4 This problem
requires an immediate, thorough, and proactive response.
This Note addresses how U.S. disaster relief and relocation policies can be
improved to accommodate the unique and growing needs of environmentally
displaced persons (EDPs).5 It will reveal how the United States has failed to
meet its responsibilities under the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement in regard to its treatment of EDPs, who should receive the same
protections as IDPs. It will also reveal how policy directives from the U.N.
Guiding Principles and the African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa should factor into U.S.
policy towards EDPs. This Note will demonstrate that the United States should
take a proactive approach to the relocation and reintegration of EDPs, including
economic stimulus incentives, the creation of an agency dedicated to the
protection and treatment of EDPs, the codification of liability for private actors
who have contributed to sea level rise and population displacement, and
expansive centralized reporting on equity issues in relocation initiatives.
Part I will provide a detailed discussion about projected sea level rise and
population displacement. Part II will describe the limited infrastructure and
reactive nature of current U.S. policies addressing coastal retreat and disaster
relief. Part III will explain existing national and international policy frameworks
for the treatment of internally displaced persons (IDPs)—persons displaced
within their own country by violence, human rights violations, or disaster,6
1. Is Sea Level Rising?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/
sealevel.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
2. See Mathew E. Hauer, Migration Induced by Sea-Level Rise Could Reshape the US Population
Landscape, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 321, 321 (2017).
3. See infra Part II (discussing displacement related to both major weather events and progressive sea
level rise).
4. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing protection of indigenous communities).
5. EDPs “are people ‘who are displaced from or who feel obligated to leave their usual place of residence
because their lives, livelihoods and welfare have been placed at serious risk as a result of adverse environmental,
ecological or climate processes and events.’” Casey B. McCormack, America’s Next Refugee Crisis:
Environmentally Displaced Persons, 32 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 8, 9 (2018) (quoting CAMILLO BOANO, ROGER
ZETTER & TIM MORRIS, REFUGEE STUD. CTR., ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING THE
LINKAGES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, LIVELIHOODS AND FORCED MIGRATION 8 (2008),
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/pb1-environmentally-displaced-people-2008.pdf).
6. See U.N. Off. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affs., Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, at 1, U.N. Doc. OCHA/IDP/2004/01 (Oct. 2004), https://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.pdf
[hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles]; infra Part III (discussing the definition of IDPs).

1282

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1279

drawing parallels between EDPs and IDPs. Part IV will then explain how
national and international policy regarding IDPs gives strong insight into how
the United States should address EDPs within its borders.

I. SEA LEVEL RISE AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES
On average, sea levels rose between eight and nine inches between 1880
and the present, with roughly a third of that occurring since 1993.7 The effects
of global warming, coinciding with a major acceleration of greenhouse gas
emissions since the 1990s, have contributed to the melting of ice sheets and
glaciers as well as the thermal expansion of existing ocean water.8 The oceans
absorb over ninety percent of heat increases in the Earth’s atmosphere caused
by the emission of greenhouse gases,9 and sea levels are projected to rise
between 12 inches and 8.2 feet above 2000 levels by 2100, depending on the
rate of greenhouse gas emissions in the immediate future.10 If global emissions
trends remain the same as they are today, carbon dioxide concentrations in the
Earth’s atmosphere will more than triple over preindustrial levels by 2100, with
catastrophic effects on sea level rise.11
As a result of rising sea levels, coastal areas are already experiencing more
frequent nuisance flooding and more devastating storm surge.12 As sea levels
rise, the average height of high tide in coastal areas and seasonal king tides—the
highest tides of the year—become more disruptive.13 Eventually, daily high tides
will rise as high as king tides.14 In many susceptible areas, high tide flooding
occurred twice as often between May 2019 and April 2020 when compared to
the same period in 2000 to 2001.15 Moreover, high tide flooding is expected to
develop into a chronic, rather than a sporadic issue.16
Rising sea levels, compounded by the effects of high tide flooding and
storm surge during major weather events, have affected large numbers of

7. Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Global Sea Level, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan.
25, 2021), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level.
8. Id.
9. Is Sea Level Rising?, supra note 1.
10. Lindsey, supra note 7.
11. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with
Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968 (2004).
12. Is Sea Level Rising?, supra note 1.
13. King Tides and Climate Change, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cre/king-tides-andclimate-change (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
14. Id.
15. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 2019 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE FLOODING WITH A 2020
OUTLOOK, at v (2020), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/Techrpt_092_2019_State_of_US_High_
Tide_Flooding_with_a_2020_Outlook_30June2020.pdf [hereinafter 2019 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE
FLOODING]; see also NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 2018 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE FLOODING WITH
A 2019 OUTLOOK (2019), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/Techrpt_090_2018_State_of_US_
HighTideFlooding_with_a_2019_Outlook_Final.pdf.
16. See 2019 STATE OF U.S. HIGH TIDE FLOODING, supra note 15, at 12.
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Americans, displacing both individual families and entire communities.17 Since
the beginning of the twenty-first century, America has seen a large number of
internal EDPs. Historically destructive Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita in
2005 led to the migration of over a million people from the Gulf Coast,
Louisiana, and Texas.18 The unprecedented flooding, evacuation, and loss of life
resulting from these storms coincided with the rapid acceleration of sea level
rise near the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century.19
Historians likened the “disaster-spurred migration” to the migration resulting
from the Dust Bowl during the 1930s.20 After Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto
Rico in 2017, over 100,000 people left the island after just five months, with
experts predicting that as much as half of the island’s population will follow.21
Subtropical Storm Theta, the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season’s 29th named
storm, broke the 2005 record of twenty-eight named storms in one season.22
Increasingly devastating hurricanes are not the only aspect of climate
related sea level rise causing displacement. Entire coastal communities across
the United States are facing permanent displacement due to the effects of
progressive sea level rise.23 Louisiana’s Isle de Jean Charles, a Native American
island community connected to the mainland by a single, frequently flooded
road, has seen a ninety-eight percent loss of land since 1955.24 Isle de Jean
Charles, along with at least seventeen other (largely Native American or
Alaskan) communities, are attempting to relocate entire populations as the sea
consumes their localities, making them uninhabitable.25 On the eastern coast of
the United States, Virginia’s Tangier Island has seen two-thirds of its land
disappear to sea level rise and coastal erosion.26 Experts predict that the entire
island will fall to the sea over the next fifty years, displacing almost five hundred

17. See Michael Isaac Stein, How to Save a Town from Rising Waters, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2018, 8:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-save-a-town-from-rising-waters/.
18. McCormack, supra note 5, at 10.
19. See id. at 9–10.
20. Id. (quoting Petula Dvorak, As Hurricane Harvey Slams Texas, a Look at the Most Devastating Storms
in U.S. History, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
retropolis/wp/2017/08/25/as-texas-braces-for-a-huge-hurricane-a-look-at-the-most-devastating-storms-in-u-shistory/).
21. Id. at 12.
22. Emily Shapiro & Daniel Manzo, How the 2020 Hurricane Season Just Set a New Record, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 10, 2020, 5:51 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/2020-hurricane-season-set-record/story?id=73168263;
see also Jonathan Erdman, Eta Becomes the Record-Tying 28th Storm in the 2020 Atlantic Hurricane Season,
WEATHER CHANNEL (Nov. 2, 2020), https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/2020-10-05-atlantic-hurricaneseason-nearing-2005-record-storms; Allison Chinchar, All the Ways Hurricane Delta Is a Historic Storm, CNN
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/07/weather/historic-storm-hurricane-delta/index.html. Storms are
named if they become strong enough to qualify as a tropical storm. What Are Hurricanes?, NASA (Sept. 3,
2014), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/nasa-knows/what-are-hurricanes-k4.html.
23. See Stein, supra note 17.
24. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Isle de Jean Charles).
25. See Stein, supra note 17; see also McCormack, supra note 5, at 8.
26. McCormack, supra note 5, at 11; see also infra Part II.B.4 (discussing Tangier Island).
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people.27 Similarly, scientists predict that, “even if humanity were to stop all
[sea-level rise inducing] carbon emissions today, at least 414 towns, villages,
and cities across the country would face relocation.”28
According to some studies, over thirteen million Americans might be
susceptible to sea level induced migration by 2100.29 According to scholar
Mathew Hauer, displacement is “likely to have profound effects on future
population landscapes,” drastically reshaping the national population
distribution.30 The coming decades will likely see “hundreds of thousands of
homes on US coasts” inundated with chronic floods.31 By 2100, if global
greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting sea level rise are not drastically
mitigated, “southern Florida, chunks of North Carolina and Virginia, much of
Boston, [and] all but a sliver of New Orleans” will be consumed by the sea.32
More and more powerful hurricanes will continue to plague those coastal areas
remaining above water.33
The resulting effects of migration will not only be felt on the coasts, but
also in inland areas “unprepared to accommodate this wave of coastal
migrants.”34 Studies suggest that the western half of the country will see a
population increase of over ten percent in the next fifty years.35 While those with
the means to relocate will likely do so on a rolling basis, others may become
“trapped” with dwindling resources, creating subsections of “involuntar[ily]
immobi[le]” populations.36 The vast majority of urban centers across the United
States will likely feel the impact of the migration.37 “The sheer magnitude of
places affected” will leave “no state . . . untouched.”38 Despite the imminence of
this problem, “infrastructure challenges of accommodating millions

27. McCormack, supra note 5, at 11.
28. Stein, supra note 17.
29. Hauer, supra note 2, at 321.
30. Id.
31. Oliver Milman, ‘We’re Moving to Higher Ground’: America’s Era of Climate Mass Migration Is
Here, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/24/americas-era-ofclimate-mass-migration-is-here.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Hauer, supra note 2, at 321.
35. Milman, supra note 31 (citing Qin Fan, Karen Fisher-Vanden & H. Allen Klaiber, Climate Change,
Migration, and Regional Economic Impacts in the United States, 5 J. ASS’N ENV’T & RES. ECONOMISTS 643
(2018)). The figures from this study include projections of Americans who will be displaced by other climate
related events such as a decrease in the arability of farmland in the Midwest. See id.
36. Hauer, supra note 2, at 324.
37. Id. at 323 (discussing migration impacts on Core Based Statistical Areas); see also Core-Based
Statistical Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/housing/housing-patterns/about/corebased-statistical-areas.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2021)). Core-Based Statistical Areas, defined by the Office of
Management and Budget, represent urban areas with adjacent territories with “a high degree of social and
economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties.” Id.
38. Hauer, supra note 2, at 324.
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of . . . migrants in largely unprepared inland municipalities is virtually
unexplored.”39

II. CURRENT U.S. FRAMEWORK: DISASTER RESPONSE AND COMMUNITY
RELOCATION
America’s current framework for handling climate related displacement
falls mostly within the category of disaster response, a largely reactive system
that historically has only responded after a major weather event has already
occurred.40 There have been a handful of federally funded relocation projects for
some coastal communities, a more proactive approach to moving whole
populations from areas immediately threatened by sea level rise.41 Neither of
these models for relocation are equipped to adequately address the needs of an
already large number of people facing permanent displacement. Below, I will
describe these disaster recovery and community relocation models as they exist
today.
A. DISASTER RESPONSE
The federal disaster response framework consists of four main
components: the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) buyout and
support programs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
insurance and grant programs, the Small Business Administration (SBA) relief
loans, and the National Flood Insurance Program.
1. FEMA Buyout Program
Under the Stafford Act, which governs disaster relief and emergency
assistance,42 FEMA is the primary federal entity responsible for coordinating
emergency disaster relief.43 FEMA responds after a formal request from a state,
tribe, territory or insular area,44 and an emergency declaration from the
president.45 FEMA assists local jurisdictions in rebuilding infrastructure,

39. Id.
40. See Tim McDonnell, The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention to, NPR: GOATS & SODA (June
20, 2018, 11:25 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-thatthe-world-barely-pays-attention-to.
41. See Stein, supra note 17; see also Rachel Waldholz, Newtok to Congress: Thank You for Saving Our
Village, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2018/03/27/newtok-to-congressthank-you-for-saving-our-village/.
42. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2018).
43. Rocio Cara Labrador & Amelia Cheatham, U.S. Disaster Relief at Home and Abroad, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-disaster-relief-home-and-abroad (Sept. 21, 2020). FEMA
operates under the Secretary of Homeland Security. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RECOVERY
FRAMEWORK 35 (4th ed. 2019), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/NRF_FINALApproved_
2011028.pdf.
44. Natural Disaster Response and Recovery, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/recovery
(last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
45. Labrador & Cheatham, supra note 43.
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providing emergency housing, and offering financial assistance.46 The Agency
also offers some tailored support to individuals and families affected by
presidentially-declared disasters.47
Significant for the purposes of this Note, FEMA also administers a
managed retreat program through which local officials may request funding to
“buy out” homes or neighborhoods prone to hazardous or repetitive flooding.48
Until very recently, FEMA was completely reactive, offering no proactive
solutions.49 In August 2020, FEMA and HUD announced unprecedented
funding for managed retreat designed to move communities from flood zones
before the next major weather event occurs.50 Still, even with this new funding
and a shifted focus to proactive relocation, states and local governments must
continue to rely on the buyout framework.51 The limitations of this framework
are described below.
Under the buyout system, state and local governments are responsible for
determining which homes or areas are eligible for a buyout, which often include
residential properties located in areas designated by FEMA as “Special Flood
Hazard Areas.”52 If FEMA agrees with the state’s and/or local government’s
determination, it will usually require the state or municipality to contribute 25%
of the property acquisition costs, with FEMA supplying the remaining 75%.53
Eligible homeowners are offered “pre-disaster fair-market value” for the

46. Id.
47. See Programs to Support Disaster Survivors, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/disaster-survivors (Jan. 25, 2021).
48. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, For Communities Plagued by Repeated Flooding,
Property Acquisition May Be the Answer (May 28, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20180417114512/
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2014/05/28/communities-plagued-repeated-flooding-property-acquisitionmay-be-answer.
49. See McDonnell, supra note 40.
50. Christopher Flavelle, U.S. Flood Strategy Shifts to ‘Unavoidable’ Relocation of Entire Neighborhoods,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/climate/flooding-relocation-managedretreat.html. It should also be noted that the federal government has pushed local officials to exercise eminent
domain to force resistant homeowners from their property in flood-prone areas or forfeit federal assistance with
relocation efforts. Christopher Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/climate/government-land-evictionfloods.html [hereinafter Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood Zones].
51. Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from Flood Zones, supra note 50;
see also Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-infrastructure-communities (last visited Apr. 19,
2021).
52. Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Fact Sheet: Acquisition of Property After a Flood
Event (Nov. 13, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20200706012204/https://www.fema.gov/news-release/
2018/11/13/fact-sheet-acquisition-property-after-flood-event [hereinafter FEMA Fact Sheet]. A Special Flood
Hazard Area has “special flood, mudflow or flood-related erosion hazards” and appears in a designated zone on
FEMA’s Flood Hazard Boundary Map or Flood Insurance Rate Map. Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/glossary/special-flood-hazard-area-sfha (July 7, 2020).
53. Press Release, supra note 48.
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home,54 which is then typically razed and the land is subsequently “restored to
open space” to buffer the coastal area from future flooding.55
On average, it takes over 5.5 years from the time of the disaster for a FEMA
buyout to close.56 According to a study of recent buyouts, the affected residents
have long ago had to relocate and stabilize before seeing any compensation for
the property.57 Between 1989 and 2017, FEMA funded over 43,000 buyouts for
properties prone to chronic flooding, but the number of properties included in
each buyout purchase has steadily decreased.58 The result is a piecemeal retreat
from coastal flood zones, “miss[ing] opportunities to more strategically restore
floodplains and reduce overall flood risk.”59
The buyout system has also faced criticism for perceived inequities.60 As
discussed above, municipalities must initiate and administer the buyout process,
and states and municipalities are expected to contribute 25% of the costs.61
Studies suggest that localities with higher average income and education levels
are more likely to administer buyouts, likely due to both funding issues and local
government capacity to initiate and administer the buyout.62 Some warn that
poor, rural communities without strong governmental infrastructure are
particularly vulnerable to the risks associated with remaining in high flood
areas.63
In fact, the populations of communities deemed most vulnerable to climate
disasters by the Centers for Disease Control are, on average, 81% minority.64
Within the counties that administer buyouts, the properties involved are usually
in lower-income, racially diverse areas.65 While this could mean that
marginalized populations are benefitting more from the buyouts, it could also
mean that counties are using the buyouts to selectively remove these
communities. According to a study of recent FEMA buyouts, it is unclear
“whether white residents are relocating away from areas of racial diversity or
whether people of color are relocated.”66 Because FEMA does not keep data of

54. FEMA Fact Sheet, supra note 52.
55. Katharine J. Mach, Caroline M. Kraan, Miyuki Hino, A.R. Siders, Erica M. Johnston & Christopher B.
Field, Managed Retreat Through Voluntary Buyouts of Flood-Prone Properties, 5 SCI. ADVANCES, Oct. 2019,
at 1, 1.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Press Release, supra note 48.
62. Mach et al., supra note 55, at 3.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Thomas Frank, Population of Top 10 Counties for Disasters: 81% Minority, E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE
(June 8, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2020/06/08/stories/1063347205.
65. Mach et al., supra note 55, at 6.
66. Id.
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homeowner identity, it is challenging to meaningfully analyze these equity
issues.67
The recent buyout study warns that “when social equity is not explicit [in
buyout programs], inequitable implementation practices . . . may occur.”68
These can include political pressures to allocate resources to the privileged
instead of marginalized people, perceptions of coercion among buyout
recipients, “deliberate findings of substantial damage in socially vulnerable
areas, or relocations to areas with equal flood risk and greater social
vulnerability.”69 The study urges that closer evaluation of administered buyout
programs is essential to ensuring that buyouts are equitable going forward.70
Additionally, because of the increase in frequency and magnitude of
natural disasters, FEMA has seen unprecedented demand over the last decade,
with eight of its most expensive years occurring between 2009 and 2019.71 Many
argue that FEMA has awarded too much support for small scale disasters which
states and local governments were well-equipped to handle on their own, leaving
a shortage of resources and personnel when major disasters strike.72 For
example, when Hurricanes Irma, Harvey, and Maria hit the United States in
2017, “almost half of the agency’s emergency workforce was tied up when the
first sheets of rain began to inundate large parts of Texas,” a pattern that FEMA
admits is a continuing issue.73 Limitations on FEMA’s ability to respond to
multiple disasters at once are bound to continue as natural disasters become more
and more frequent and destructive.
Relatedly, the cost to buy out all thirteen million Americans in flood-prone
areas could cost the government up to $13 trillion.74 And while not all thirteen
million people are in immediate danger, the number of displaced persons will
continue to climb as coastal communities experience more severe high tide
flooding and catastrophic storm surge resulting from rising sea levels.75 The
Department of Homeland Security anticipates that “disaster survivors may have
recovery needs that cannot be fully met by traditional government programs due
to eligibility or program limitations.”76 In response, it has created the Unmet
Needs Committee to centralize private organizations that can assist recovery

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Gabrielle Canon, The US Won’t Be Prepared for the Next Natural Disaster, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/18/natural-disaster-preparation-fema-hurricanes.
72. Thomas Frank, Why the U.S. Disaster Agency Is Not Ready for Catastrophes, SCI. AM. (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-the-u-s-disaster-agency-is-not-ready-for-catastrophes/.
73. Id.
74. Milman, supra note 31.
75. Id.
76. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL DISASTER RECOVERY FRAMEWORK 34 (2d ed. 2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20201130202448/https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/14660149981234bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National_Disaster_Recovery_Framework2nd.pdf.
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where the government is unable.77 However, there are no guarantees that private
organizations can or will fill the voids left by a federal system strapped by
growing demand.
2. HUD Program
HUD offers both a mortgage insurance program and a community grant
program to the disaster response framework. HUD offers mortgage insurance to
“lenders against the risk of default on mortgages to qualified disaster victims.”78
For those whose homes are located in a presidentially designated disaster area,
“[i]nsured mortgages may be used to finance the purchase or reconstruction of a
one-family home that will be the principal residence of the homeowner.”79 These
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured mortgages enjoy at least a
ninety-day moratorium on foreclosures to assist borrowers during disaster
recovery, and may be eligible for a waiver of other late fees.80
Additionally, after a presidentially declared disaster, “Congress may
appropriate additional funding for the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG),” which provides flexibility to local and state governments for a range
of recovery efforts, especially for low-income areas.81 However, receiving
funding through CDBG can be slow, because the program was not created as a
permanent disaster relief mechanism.82 As a result, HUD must “essentially
design a new program from scratch” for each new disaster related grant.83
Congress introduced legislation in 2019 to make the HUD disaster relief
program permanent to help alleviate this problem.84
3. Small Business Administration Program
The SBA can also provide funding for disaster relief to both businesses and
private individuals.85 SBA offers low-interest, long-term loans to affected
individuals who cannot qualify for credit elsewhere.86 Loans up to $200,000 are
available for repair or replacement of primary homes, and loans up to $40,000
77. Id.
78. Mortgage Insurance for Disaster Victims Section 203(H), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/ins/203h-dft (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
79. Id.
80. Disaster Relief Options for FHA Homeowners, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/nsc/qaho0121 (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
81. Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program, HUD EXCH.,
https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-dr/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
82. Christopher Flavelle, As Disasters Multiply, Billions in Recovery Funds Go Unspent, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/climate/federal-hurricane-wildfire-disaster-funds-unspent.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Home and Property Disaster Loans Program Description, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.,
https://www.disasterassistance.gov/get-assistance/forms-of-assistance/4477 (Sept. 15, 2020); see also Business
Disaster Loans Program Description, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.disasterassistance.gov/getassistance/forms-of-assistance/4479 (Sept. 15, 2020).
86. Home and Property Disaster Loans Program Description, supra note 85.
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are available to replace personal property after a disaster.87 SBA also offers loans
up to $2 million to businesses and nonprofits for disaster-related “losses not fully
covered by insurance or other means.”88 Economic Injury Disaster Loans may
be offered regardless of whether the business suffered any physical damage, and
could be used to fortify the business against the risk of future disaster related
damage.89
4. National Flood Insurance Program
Another federal avenue for individual relief is the National Flood Insurance
Program, which “provides flood insurance to property owners, renters and
businesses . . . . [and] works with communities required to adopt and enforce
floodplain management regulations.”90 Despite the availability of this program,
“roughly one-third of American homeowners in flood-prone cities have flood
insurance.”91 Many cite the cost of flood insurance as a prohibitive factor.92 Even
those who do have insurance are often left with inadequate compensation.
For example, after the disastrous Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in
2005, Louisiana estimated that the average homeowner received almost $6
thousand less than the value of their insurance claim.93 This led “to an extra $900
million [in] losses for 160,000 families,” a sizeable bill that the federal
government was unable (or unwilling) to foot.94 Unable to recover, many
residents never returned to the city.95 A year after Katrina hit, the population of
New Orleans had decreased from 484,674 to roughly 230,172—a population
loss of over 50%.96 The National Flood Insurance Program is ill-equipped to fill
the gap in flood insurance coverage and claims payouts, operating at an average
net loss of $1.4 billion per year.97
B. COMMUNITY RELOCATION EFFORTS
While many communities face retreat because of destructive coastal
storms, others—mostly Native American and Alaskan communities—face the
permanent and inevitable loss of their land.98 However, only two, Isle de Jean
Charles in Louisiana and Newtok in Alaska, have received support from the
87. Id.
88. Business Disaster Loans Program Description, supra note 85.
89. Id.
90. Flood Insurance, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance (Jan. 8,
2021).
91. Labrador & Cheatham, supra note 43.
92. Id.
93. Leslie Eaton & Joseph B. Treaster, Insurance Woes for Hurricane Katrina Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/business/worldbusiness/02iht-orleans.4.7353442.html.
94. Id.
95. Allison Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Impact, DATA CTR. (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-impact/.
96. Id.
97. Canon, supra note 71.
98. Stein, supra note 17.
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federal government.99 As a result, localities have attempted a number of other
responses to relocation, including attempts to hold private actors accountable for
costs, as well as attempts at infrastructural fixes to delay the necessities of
relocation.
Subpart 1 below describes the government-supported relocations of Isle de
Jean Charles and Newtok. Subpart 2 describes a private buyout administered by
Shell following widespread chemical contamination in Diamond, Louisiana.
Subpart 3 describes the unsuccessful attempt to hold private actors liable for
relocation costs in Kivalina, Alaska. It then gives a short description of ongoing
efforts to utilize public nuisance law to hold private actors accountable. Subpart
4 briefly describes the predicament facing Tangier Island, Virginia, where
infrastructural costs of remaining on the island will likely prove prohibitive.
These attempts to relocate or fortify communities, and the challenges posed by
each, illustrate the need to develop a comprehensive governmental approach to
relocation.
1. Government Relocations: Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana, & Newtok,
Alaska
Isle de Jean Charles is a town of about ninety-nine100 members of the
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Native American tribe.101 Since 1960, the island
has lost over ninety-eight percent of its land.102 The only road connecting the
town to the mainland—and critical emergency services and infrastructure—has
become completely exposed to water on either side.103 What used to be thick
marsh has washed away, leaving the small island’s escape route susceptible to
immediate flooding with any substantial storm event.104 The island, which
became home to the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw because of the violent Indian
Removal Act, will soon be uninhabitable.105 The Indian Removal Act forced
Native American tribes to relocate and forfeit millions of acres of their land.106
Now, due to the devastating effects of climate change-induced sea level rise, the
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw face the injustice of having to relocate once again.
Through the Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement Project (“the Project”), the United
States is funding and administering the wholesale relocation of the island

99. Id.; see also Waldholz, supra note 41.
100. Though some estimates put the population count much lower. See Jenny Jarvie, On a Sinking Louisiana
Island, Many Aren’t Ready to Leave, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/lana-jean-charles-sinking-louisiana-island-20190423-htmlstory.html.
101. Stein, supra note 17.
102. Jarvie, supra note 100.
103. Stein, supra note 17.
104. Id.
105. Id. The rapid sea level changes to Isle de Jean Charles were compounded by irresponsible dredging
practices by oil and gas companies and poor management of natural water flow due to levee construction. Id.
106. Indian Treaties and the Removal Act of 1830, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/
milestones/1830-1860/indian-treaties (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
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community to a more inland location.107 HUD granted $48.3 million dollars to
the Project following its application to the National Disaster Resilience
Competition in 2014.108
The Project’s goal is to “construct[] a brand-new town and fill[] it with the
displaced occupants and culture of Isle de Jean Charles.”109 While the
government has provided the funding, at the cost of about $487,000 per person,
logistical challenges have prevented Isle de Jean Charles from making
substantial progress.110 Finding a new location that will provide enough of an
economy to support the residents is a major challenge, especially because peace
and quiet, and retaining a sense of community, are paramount to the island’s
residents.111 Implementing a plan or process has proven difficult, raising the
question of “whether government-backed community resettlements will be
feasible for the hundreds of communities that are approaching similar
dissolutions.”112
Unlike Isle de Jean Charles, the town of Newtok, Alaska, has a fairly
concrete plan for its relocation.113 Newtok, home to about 315 residents,114 had
plans well underway by the time it received federal assistance.115 “[R]apidly
losing land to a combination of erosion and thawing permafrost,” it is expected
to become uninhabitable “within a matter of years.”116 The town traded land with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 2003 for a site further inland from the
existing village, and plans to use retrofitted military barracks to reduce
construction costs.117 The 2018 federal budget bill allocated $15 million dollars
to the Denali Commission,118 an independent federal agency created in 1998 to
bolster Alaska’s infrastructure and utilities and provide economic support.119
The funding will help Newtok to build twenty-eight houses at the new location,
but the total cost of relocation is estimated to exceed $100 million, and the $15
million in funding is only a one-time provision that will not renew.120

107. Stein, supra note 17.
108. Id. HUD administered the competition looking for projects focused on proactively planning and
preparing for natural disasters. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Waldholz, supra note 41.
114. Newtok, AK, CENSUS REP., https://censusreporter.org/profiles/16000US0253820-newtok-ak/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2021).
115. Waldholz, supra note 41.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Denali Commission Story, DENALI COMM’N, https://www.denali.gov/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
120. Waldholz, supra note 41.

April 2021]

THE WATER IS COMING

1293

2. Individual Buyouts: Diamond, Louisiana
Isle de Jean Charles and Newtok are exceptional in that most “prior
resettlements . . . have largely followed a model of individual buyouts.”121 In the
case of Diamond, Louisiana, the Shell Oil Company, whose chemicals factory
caused leaks and explosions for decades, provided a buyout deal that offered a
lump-sum payment for residents to move elsewhere.122 “One by one, the
residents of Diamond took the money and left,” resulting in the total
disembodiment of the historically Black community there.123 The loss of
Diamond highlights the “difference between saving a community and saving its
individual members,”124 the difference between individual buyouts and
wholesale relocation of communities.125 Furthermore, private entities are
unlikely to be a dependable option, as illustrated by the prolonged litigation
surrounding the relocation of Kivalina, Alaska.
3. Public Nuisance Claims: Kivalina, Alaska
The Native Inupiat village of Kivalina, Alaska, home to roughly 400
residents, has historically depended on formations of sea ice to protect it from
coastal storms.126 The sea ice has become progressively less durable, forming
later and melting earlier each season.127 Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil Corporation explains that this diminished protection, when
combined with sea level rise and progressive erosion, results in “future storms
threaten[ing] buildings and critical infrastructure in [Kivalina] with imminent
devastation.”128 In 2008, Kivalina filed suit against several fossil fuel
companies, seeking damages of $400 million for relocation of the village.129 The
complaint alleged that the companies’ emissions of greenhouse gases
contributed considerably to global warming and caused “substantial and
unreasonable interference” with their right “to use and enjoy public and private
property in Kivalina.”130
In a motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs raised
claims involving nonjusticiable political questions.131 They also argued that
Kivalina lacked standing because the requisite causal link between the injuries
121. Stein, supra note 17.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Annah E. Piggott-McKellar, Karen E. McNamara, Patrick D. Nunn & Seci T. Sekinini, Moving
People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fiji, 8 SOC. SCI. 133, 142 (2019) (studying
community cohesion in the relocations of Denimanu and Vunidogoloa villages in Fiji)
126. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 853–54.
129. Kivalina Lawsuit (Re Global Warming), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/kivalina-lawsuit-re-global-warming (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
130. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854.
131. Id.

1294

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1279

to Kivalina and the defendants’ emissions was too attenuated.132 The district
court agreed with both arguments and granted the motion.133 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal on different grounds.134 Relying on the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Massachusetts v. EPA and American Electric Power v.
Connecticut,135 the Ninth Circuit held that Kivalina’s federal common law claim
had been displaced by the Clean Air Act, which empowers the EPA to regulate
emissions of greenhouse gases.136 It concluded that the existing regulatory
framework occupied the field, precluding federal common law nuisance
claims.137 The Supreme Court declined to hear the final appeal in 2013.138
Nonetheless, many of these nuisance claims have moved to state court.
a. Continuing Efforts at Court-Awarded Compensation
The challenges of federal preemption and of proving causation in common
law public nuisance claims will continue to pose roadblocks to court-awarded
compensation to relocate. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have begun bringing nuisance
claims in state court in an attempt to work around federal displacement issues.139
In California, the cities of San Francisco and Oakland brought state law public
nuisance claims against major oil companies seeking compensation for projected
infrastructural costs incurred due to rising sea levels.140 The cases were
consolidated and removed to federal court, where they were dismissed.141 The
court held that plaintiffs’ state law claims were controlled by federal common
law because of their “international scope,” and because “the anticipated coastal
flooding is uniquely federal” since it involves the flooding of “the navigable
waters of the United States.”142 In the dismissal order, Judge Alsup of the
Northern District of California explained that the claims “undoubtedly implicate
the interests of countless governments, both foreign and domestic,” and as a

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 858.
135. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the “Clean Air Act authorizes the
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions”); see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 415
(2011) (holding that “the Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection Agency action the Act
authorizes . . . displace” federal common-law public nuisance claims).
136. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857–58.
137. Id.
138. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 569 U.S. 1000 (2013) (denying certiorari); see also
Kivalina Lawsuit (Re Global Warming), supra note 129.
139. Kurtis Alexander, San Francisco, Oakland Sue Major Oil Companies over Rising Seas, S.F. GATE
(Sept. 20, 2017, 9:15 PM), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/San-Francisco-Oakland-sue-major-oilcompanies-12215044.php.
140. Id.
141. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019, 1028–29 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting motion
to dismiss).
142. Id. at 1021.
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result deserve “a solution on a more vast scale than can be supplied by a district
judge or jury in a public nuisance case.”143
Despite this judicial treatment, attorneys for three localities in California
have brought separate actions in state court against big oil companies under
creative new theories of nuisance, negligence, and products liability.144 In 2018,
Judge Chhabria granted remand after defendants removed the cases to federal
court, concluding that “federal common law does not govern the plaintiffs’
claims” and “does not preclude them from asserting the state law claims in these
lawsuits.”145 It is possible that creative lawyering may nudge the courts toward
awarding relief for climate related damages. However, the long-term success of
public nuisance suits to remedy the damages associated with climate change and
sea level rise remains unclear. Nor can any future victories in the courts
guarantee relocation for the most marginalized populations, or that any sense of
cultural cohesion will be retained. As such, the problem requires other avenues
for immediate relief.
4. Infrastructural Solutions: Tangier Island, Virginia
Finally, many communities like Tangier Island, Virginia, have turned to
infrastructural solutions to allow them to remain on their disappearing lands.146
However, this option will all too frequently be cost prohibitive; the Army Corp
of Engineers estimated that coastal engineering to provide a temporary fix would
cost Tangier about $30 million.147 Costs continue to accrue while maintaining
and repairing any temporary, infrastructural solution. And while smaller
communities grapple with how and when to relocate, securing funding and
making such decisions becomes more difficult “when sea-level rise knocks on
the door of a major U.S. city like Miami,” says scholar Casey McCormack.148
The Department of Homeland Security acknowledges that “[s]ome
communities . . . may conclude that success requires relocating all or some
portion of the community assets and restoring vacated areas to a more natural,
predevelopment environment” rather than rebuilding in place.149 Still, says
Michael Isaac Stein, “despite its inevitability, there is no official framework [in
the U.S.] to handle this displacement [and] no U.S. government agency, process,

143. Id. at 1026, 1029. The Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Alsup’s order accepting federal subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims on May 26, 2020 and remanded the case, directing the district court to reconsider
whether other grounds exist to remove the cases to federal court. City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 960 F.3d 570, 585
(9th Cir. 2020); see also City of Oakland v. BP PLC, U.S. CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., chamberlitigation.com/
cases/city-oakland-v-bp-plc (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
144. See Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see also
Complaint at 3–5, Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. Civ.
1704935).
145. Cnty. of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
146. See McCormack, supra note 5, at 11.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 76, at 49.
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or funding dedicated to confronting” the imminent mass migration of Americans
as the sea continues to rise.150
Acknowledging the steep limitations inherent in the current U.S. approach
to community relocation, this Note now turns to existing national and
international policies toward internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Part
below will emphasize aspects of IDP policy that may prove useful if
meaningfully and proactively applied to environmentally displaced persons
(EDPs).

III. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS POLICIES
Governments and the United Nations have struggled with how to classify
EDPs, who face displacement because of environmental factors.151 The United
Nations defines IDPs as those “who have been forced or obliged to . . . leave
their homes . . . in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State
border.”152 While natural disasters are included in this definition, most IDP
policies focus on violence and human rights violations, and completely ignore
IDPs facing displacement because of sea level rise or other permanent, but
relatively slowly progressing, environmental factors.153 So, while EDPs face
many of the same challenges as IDPs—permanent relocation, economic
instability, and loss of community—they do not fit neatly into international
humanitarian conceptions.154 For purposes of this Note, I will not argue which
formalistic title should be applied to EDPs because, in McCormack’s words,
these “technical, definitional nuances . . . are irrelevant to the millions of
Americans” facing imminent relocation as a result of sea level rise and other
climate related natural disasters.155 Rather, I will examine how current domestic
and international frameworks for handling IDPs can be useful to the situation in
the United States, and where the United States needs to improve in order to meet
its own commitments to IDPs and to achieve the goals provided by the U.N.
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“U.N. Guiding Principles” or
“Principles”).156

150. Stein, supra note 17.
151. See McCormack, supra note 5, at 9.
152. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6, at 1. In this instance, “state” refers to an internationally
recognized nation, country, or territory.
153. See id.
154. See McCormack, supra note 5, at 9.
155. Id.
156. See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6.
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A. U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The U.N. Guiding Principles were originally created in 1998 under the
direction of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and updated in 2004.157
The Principles are intended to provide governments and international
development and humanitarian agencies with standards for providing
“protection and assistance during displacement, and [to] set forth guarantees for
safe return, resettlement and reintegration,” regardless of whether the
reintegration occurs in the original locale or in a new location within the State.158
They identify the rights and guarantees that should be afforded to IDPs as well
as the responsibilities of national governments to IDPs within their borders.159
The Principles are not legally binding.160 However, their content originates in
binding concepts of international human rights, humanitarian law, and refugee
law, and, according to the Brookings Institution, “they have come to
acquire . . . a good deal of international standing and moral authority.”161 Many
countries and organizations, including the United States, have adopted some
version of the Principles to guide policy choices.162 The following paragraphs
will highlight aspects of the principles significant to the analysis of how the
United States should apply IDP policies to domestic EDPs.
First and foremost, the U.N. Guiding Principles are clear: “National
authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and
humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their
jurisdiction.”163 This sets the standard that national governments, rather than
individuals or local governments, must lead the way in providing safeguards to
IDPs. Authorities are to provide proper accommodation; safe conditions with
proper nutrition, health and hygiene; and ensure that all possible steps are taken
to prevent the separation of families.164 The Principles state that authorities
should involve the affected IDPs “in the planning and management of their
relocation,” and provide an effective remedy for contested decisions.165
Furthermore, the Principles say states are under a particular obligation to protect
against the displacement of indigenous people, minorities, and other groups with
a special dependency on and attachment to the land.166

157. Id. at Introductory Note.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Roberta Cohen, Introduction to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, BROOKINGS (Sept.
23,
2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/introduction-to-the-guiding-principles-on-internaldisplacement-2/.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6, princ. 3, cl. 1, at 2.
164. Id. princ. 7, cl. 2, at 4.
165. Id. princ. 7, cl. 3(d), at 5.
166. Id. princ. 9, at 5.
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Importantly, IDPs have the right to “be protected against forcible return
to . . . any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.”167
Authorities must allow IDPs voluntary return to their home, but must also
facilitate their resettlement and integration elsewhere in the country.168 These
principles highlight the national government’s responsibility to allow IDPs the
freedom to choose, while also providing them with a feasible alternative to
returning to an uninhabitable area. This should include encouraging and
supporting IDPs in seeking employment opportunities and engaging in gainful
economic activity.169 Finally, governments have a “duty and responsibility to
assist” IDPs in recovering property and possessions or assist them in obtaining
compensation or fair reparations for their losses.170
Although the U.N. Guiding Principles suggest policies to assist IDPs, the
framework is fairly general and its application can mean many things. Below, I
will briefly explain U.S. policy regarding IDPs before engaging with the African
Union’s Kampala Convention, the “first binding multilateral instrument
dedicated to the implementation of the Guiding Principles.”171
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IDPS
In response to the U.N. Guiding Principles, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) created the USAID Assistance to Internally
Displaced Persons Policy (“the U.S. Policy”) in 2004.172 The U.S. Policy affirms
many of the basic premises outlined in the U.N. Guiding Principles, recognizing
the urgency of the global situation regarding IDPs and affirming the “ultimate
goal . . . to enable IDPs to become fully productive contributors to economic and
social progress in their local communities and countries.”173 Strikingly, the U.S.
Policy focuses almost, if not completely exclusively, on the issue of IDPs
abroad, promising humanitarian and strategic support without mentioning the
application of these processes domestically.174 The document states that
“USAID will encourage the governments of affected countries to fulfill their
responsibilities to protect and assist their own citizens,”175 perhaps suggesting
that the document’s authors did not think IDP’s a significant policy problem for
the U.S. The agency assigned to create the U.S. Policy, the Agency for
International Development, suggests the same.

167. Id. princ. 15, subsec. (d), at 8.
168. Id. princ. 28, cl. 1, at 14.
169. Id. princ. 22, cl. 1(b), at 12.
170. Id. princ. 29, cl. 2, at 15.
171. Werner Scholtz, The Day After No Tomorrow? Persons Displaced Environmentally Through Climate
Change: AU Laws to the Rescue?, 35 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 36, 46 (2010).
172. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID ASSISTANCE TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS POLICY
(2004), https://www.geneseo.edu/~iompress/USAIDidpPolicy.pdf.
173. Id. at 7.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 6.
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Nonetheless, the policy has some strengths. It identifies distinct phases of
displacement: (1) the initial emergency phase, requiring immediate
humanitarian aid for essential provisions of food, housing, and healthcare; (2)
the care and maintenance phase, requiring access to legal documents, education,
and tools to support self-reliance; (3) the transitional reintegration phase,
requiring transportation and infrastructural support; and (4) the long-term
development phase, requiring repairs and improvements to existing systems.176
The accompanying USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons
Policy Implementation Guidelines (“Implementation Guidelines”) give greater
detail to the technical aspects of the policy framework.177 The Implementation
Guidelines identify an additional stage in the displacement process: the preemergency preparedness phase.178 During this phase, “proper steps include early
warning and monitoring systems, mechanisms for information
exchange . . . [and] assessments and strengthening of response capacity.”179
The Implementation Guidelines encourage a number of interrelated
approaches to all relocation phases.180 One approach is community-based
programming, emphasizing active participation in relocation efforts including
“rehabilitation, social justice and reconciliation, social and economic wellbeing,
good governance, and local democratic participation.”181 Another approach is
strategic planning, which includes establishing “provisions to prevent, address,
and mitigate population displacements.”182 A major strength of these aspects of
the Implementation Guidelines is their emphasis on proactivity. They promote
planning to allow the relocation process to be more informed and communitycentric, and to minimize the potential negative effects of weather events on atrisk populations.183 These are tangible policy directives that, if adapted to the
unique issues faced by EDPs in the United States, provide a strong foundation
to remedy the shortcomings of the U.S. framework for EDPs.
While the United States has no federal laws regarding treatment of IDPs,
representatives in the House and the Senate introduced the Climate Displaced
Persons Act (“the Act”) in 2019.184 The Act aims to create a new program
separate from the federal refugee program to process a minimum of 50,000

176. Id. at 7.
177. Id. at 8; see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID ASSISTANCE TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/
200mbd.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES].
178. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 177, at 2.
179. Id.; see also Piggott-McKellar et al., supra note 125, at 145 (finding that long term monitoring and
evaluation is beneficial to the adaptation process).
180. See IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 177, at 3.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Alexander C. Kaufman, House Democrats Set to Introduce First-of-Its-Kind Climate Refugee Bill,
GRIST (Oct. 26, 2019), https://grist.org/article/house-democrats-set-to-introduce-first-of-its-kind-climaterefugee-bill/.
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climate migrants each year.185 It would also require the State Department “to
create a Global Climate Resilience Strategy,” bringing climate change issues to
the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.186 Furthermore, the Act would also call on
the executive branch to keep data on the number of EDPs created by drought,
sea level rise, and extreme weather conditions, to be reported annually to
Congress.187 While the Act is revolutionary in that it brings climate change
directly into U.S. policy and forces acknowledgement of global EDPs, like the
U.S. Policy toward IDPs, it focuses on EDPs from other countries and does little
in the way of creating an infrastructure or response system for domestic EDPs.188
While these policy initiatives in the United States show stirrings around the
idea of EDPs, they do little to provide for the growing number of
environmentally displaced persons already in the United States, and for the many
thousands more to come. Discouragingly, while the U.N. General Assembly
adopted The Global Compact for Migration in December 2018 with approval by
152 countries, the United States voted against the accord, joining only three
countries opposing.189 The accord acknowledges the growing influence of
climate change on migration patterns and is intended to provide “for safe,
orderly and regular migration.”190
C. KAMPALA CONVENTION
In 2009, the African Union adopted the African Union Convention for the
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known
as the Kampala Convention.191 Africa has the largest population of IDPs in the
world, and the Kampala Convention is the first binding multilateral legal
instrument adopted for the purpose of effectuating the U.N. Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement.192 The Kampala Convention is intended to address
internal displacement from all causes, including natural disasters.193 Despite
critiques that the Kampala Convention lacks enforcement mechanisms, its

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See S. 2565, 116th Cong. (2019).
189. Israel, the Czech Republic, and Poland also voted “no” on the accord, with additional countries
abstaining. See Edith M. Lederer, UN General Assembly Endorses Global Migration Accord, WASH. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/dec/19/un-general-assembly-endorses-globalmigration-acco/.
190. Global Compact for Migration, U.N. REFUGEES & MIGRANTS, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/
migration-compact (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
191. Scholtz, supra note 171, at 46–47.
192. Id. at 46.
193. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(Kampala Convention), pmbl., Oct. 23, 2009, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/4ae9bede9/
african-union-convention-protection-assistance-internally-displaced-persons.html
[hereinafter
Kampala
Convention].
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“innovative and interesting” provisions provide useful guidance in several
areas.194
Like the U.S. Policy toward IDPs, the Kampala Convention embraces most
of the core principles from the U.N. Guiding Principles.195 The Kampala
Convention affirms that each African state “bear[s] the primary duty and
responsibility” to protect and assist IDPs, which includes a special responsibility
to “communities with special attachment to, and dependency on land.”196
Additionally, as stipulated in the U.N. Guiding Principles, the Kampala
Convention makes states responsible for providing effective remedies for
displacement, including “just and fair compensation and other forms of
reparations . . . for damage incurred as a result of displacement.”197
Furthermore, it provides that states should allow IDPs the free and informed
choice of “whether to return, integrate locally or relocate” and should assist them
“in finding sustainable solutions” following displacement.198
The more novel aspects of the Kampala Convention include a liability
mechanism for private entities and a directive to adopt policies and create an
authority to handle IDPs.199 State parties are to “ensure the accountability of
non-State actors . . . including multinational companies and private military or
security companies,” as well as those “non-state actors involved in the
exploration and exploitation of economic and natural resources leading to
displacement.”200 These liability mechanisms for non-state actors are novel to
the discussion of IDP policy, especially as it concerns climate induced
migration. Additionally, the Kampala Convention directs the states to codify the
obligations of the Kampala Convention into their own laws, to “designate an
authority or body” to protect and assist IDPs, and to “adopt . . . strategies and
policies on internal displacement at national and local levels.”201
Below, I will analyze how these novel aspects of IDP policy, as well as the
strengths of the policies shared among the U.N. Guiding Principles, the U.S.
Policy on IDPs, and the Kampala Convention can inform a more robust,
sustainable model for the treatment of EDPs in the United States.

IV. APPLYING IDP POLICIES TO CLIMATE DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
There are several ways in which the U.N. Guiding Principles and the
Kampala Convention can fortify existing U.S. policy toward EDPs and inform
new policies to handle the ever-growing number of people evacuating from the
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Scholtz, supra note 171, at 53.
See Kampala Convention, supra note 193; see also U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6.
Kampala Convention, supra note 193, art. 5, cl. 1, art. 4, cl. 5.
Id. art. 12, cl. 2.
Id. art. 11, cl. 2.
See id.
Id. art. 3, cl. 1(h)–(i).
Id. art. 3, cl. 2(b)–(c).
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coasts. While EDPs may not fall neatly into the traditional concept of IDPs, they
should be afforded the same protections as IDPs, and the United States should
be proactive about relocation efforts in areas at high risk of sea level rise and
storm related devastation. Subpart A below discusses ways in which the United
States is not meeting its responsibilities to EDPs and suggests some potential
solutions drawn from IDP policy. Subpart B, also drawing on IDP policy,
provides more general recommendations for structuring the U.S. response to
environmental displacement beyond meeting its express obligations under the
U.N. Guiding Principles.
A. OBLIGATIONS UNDER U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
There are several ways in which the United States is falling short of its
obligations under the U.N. Guiding Principles. Namely, U.S. policy toward
EDPs is lacking in its treatment of indigenous peoples, its efforts to effectively
integrate EDPs into local economies, and in providing compensation to EDPs
for their losses.
1. Protection of Indigenous People
The United States is not meeting its obligations under the U.N. Guiding
Principles to protect indigenous people, minorities, and those “with a special
dependency on and attachment to their lands.”202 Of the at least seventeen mostly
native communities seeking permanent relocation in the United States,203 only
two have received any federal support. In both instances, the funding was given
as a one-off. For Isle de Jean Charles, it came as a result of a one-time
competition to create sustainable responses to climate change,204 and for
Newtok, the funding was a one-time grant through a federal agency.205 Many of
the challenges with these attempted relocations relate to building or finding an
economy at potential new locations capable of supporting the populations while
still retaining the cultural hallmarks that are sacred to the displaced people.206
The Kampala Convention recommends that relocation authorities should
“consult internally displaced persons and allow them to participate in decisions
relating to their protection and assistance.”207 Studies of successful climate
related relocations in Fiji suggest that a participatory process involving
community members throughout both planning and execution is essential.208 A
case study involving the climate related relocations of Denimanu and
Vunidogoloa, two villages in Fiji, shows that when residents feel that the
community has made the choice to move, cultural and social cohesion and the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6, princ. 9, at 5.
Stein, supra note 17.
Id.
Waldholz, supra note 41.
Stein, supra note 17.
Kampala Convention, supra note 193, art. 9, cl. 2(k).
Piggott-McKellar et al., supra note 179, at 145.
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shared sense of community benefit.209 The study also showed that relocating
within lands owned by the same group or family, called mataqali, was important
to cultural preservation.210 This may suggest that relocations of indigenous
people, or any other group that values cultural cohesion, may benefit from
considering locations nearby to similar or related cultural resources.
Additionally, the Fiji case study showed that allowing the community to selfidentify its priorities improved livelihood outcomes.211 As such, any policy
towards EDPs going forward should include a participatory mechanism to
actively engage relocating communities in each stage of the process.
2. Economic Integration
In regard to the maintenance and improvement of livelihoods, the United
States is falling short of its obligation under the Guiding Principles to “facilitate
the integration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons.”212 IDPs
have the right “to seek freely opportunities for employment and to participate in
economic activities.”213 This relates to the necessity of providing an economy
willing and ready to accept displaced persons. For example, one of the principal
challenges faced by the Isle de Jean Charles Relocation Project has been finding
an area with enough economic activity to support the financial security of the
displaced population.214 To meet its obligation under the Guiding Principles, the
United States will need to implement proactive solutions to facilitate economic
integration for EDPs.
The Fiji case study discussed above finds that targeted livelihood planning
can effectively protect and improve livelihoods in a new location and urges the
importance of ensuring that the necessary economic infrastructure is available
there.215 According to the study, “in Vunidogoloa, the provision of livelihood
alternatives . . . (such as pineapple plantations, fish ponds, and cattle) improved
outcomes across natural and financial capital.”216 In the United States, similar
efforts at livelihood planning could look like the creation of New Deal-style
work projects such as those contemplated in the Green New Deal for relocating
communities and individuals.217 The Green New Deal, a policy proposal brought
forth by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the House of Representatives and Edward

209. Id. at 142.
210. Id. at 135–36.
211. Id. at 145.
212. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6, princ. 28, cl. 1, at 14.
213. Id. princ. 22, cl. 1(b), at 12.
214. Stein, supra note 17.
215. Piggott-McKellar et al., supra note 179, at 145.
216. Id.
217. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal? A
Climate Proposal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/greennew-deal-questions-answers.html. The Green New Deal is “a grand plan for tackling climate change” that “calls
on the federal government to dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions, create high-paying jobs, ensure that
clean air, clean water and healthy food are basic human rights, and end all forms of oppression.” Id.
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J. Markey in the Senate, is designed to drastically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions and stimulate the economy through clean energy work projects.218 It
sets out “to create millions of good, high-wage jobs in the United States” by
forming work projects across the country to repair and upgrade existing
infrastructure and build new, energy-efficient, and sustainable infrastructure.219
Pairing Green New Deal employment projects with incentives to proactively
relocate would benefit the preservation of livelihoods while addressing critical
infrastructural weaknesses in coastal areas.220 Another option might be to
arrange contracts with existing employers in or near relocation sites to ensure
that a sufficient number of jobs are available for relocating individuals.
3. Compensation for Losses
Finally, the United States is failing its responsibility under the U.N.
Guiding Principles to assist IDPs to either recover their property or to receive
“appropriate compensation or . . . just reparation” for their losses.221 Those who
do not receive FEMA buyouts must return to coastal areas with continuing risks
to safety, property, and economic prosperity as rising sea levels and severe
weather events continue to beleaguer coastal communities.222 Relatedly, the
shortcomings of the buyout program also implicate the U.N. Guiding Principles
duty to protect IDPs from “forcible return” to an area “where their life, safety,
liberty and/or health would be at risk.”223 Despite these failures, the United
States has indicated its commitment to IDPs abroad—“to enable IDPs to become
fully productive contributors to economic and social progress,” and to assist in
the long-term development phase of reintegrating IDPs into society.224
Optimistically, with some changes, this commitment can be channeled towards
the dire and growing situation for domestic EDPs.
B. THE PATH FORWARD: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEANINGFUL
PROTECTION OF EDPS
While there is no simple answer to the issue of EDPs, some workable
solutions to their problems—namely, lack of funding for relocation and
reparations, piecemeal relocation resulting in fractured communities, and the
challenge of reintegrating EDPs as productive members of the economy—can
be drawn from the existing policy frameworks for IDPs. The Subparts below
discuss the potential benefits of codifying liability for corporate actors, focusing
218. Friedman, supra note 217.
219. H.R. Res. 109.
220. I thank my classmate, Michael Gasbarro, for suggesting that the government “could incentivize people
to relocate with some sort of benefit derived from green initiatives” in the Green New Deal. See infra Part V.B.2
for a discussion of economic incentives.
221. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6, princ. 29, cl. 2, at 15.
222. See Milman, supra note 31.
223. U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 6, princ. 15, cl. (d), at 8.
224. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 172, at 1.
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existing agency efforts to provide economic incentives for relocation, and
creating a centralized agency or authority that utilizes centralized reporting.
1. Funding and Codified Liability
One of the ubiquitous challenges of relocating people, whether by
individual buyouts or by wholesale relocation of a community, is funding. As
discussed, FEMA’s budget and resources continue to be stretched beyond its
means, as does the National Flood Insurance Program, which operates at a major
annual deficit.225 Furthermore, as we saw from the Kivalina lawsuits, we cannot
rely on private industry to help foot the bill, despite their disproportional
contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions.226 This is partly because the
existing judicial structure for nuisance claims requiring the showing of a causal
link is not well suited to the reality of aggregated emissions, and partly due to
federal common law preemption, as discussed above.227 The result is a glaring
hole in holding private industry liable for their contributions to climate change.
For example, according to the New York Times, we know that twenty of the
largest international “fossil fuel companies are responsible for 35 percent of
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions since 1965,”228 and that the cement
industry alone contributes roughly eight percent of the world’s carbon dioxide
emissions.229 Allowing these multinational actors to escape liability severely
hinders the federal government’s ability to adequately compensate EDPs for
their losses, at least without making major adjustments to federal budgetary
choices.
The Kampala Convention offers a radical solution to the issue of funding.
It asserts that States (nations within the African Union) are to “ensure the
accountability of non-State actors . . . including multinational companies
and . . . non-state actors involved in the exploration and exploitation of
economic and natural resources leading to displacement.”230 Furthermore, it
directs states to codify these obligations into their respective bodies of law.231
Codifying liability and financial obligations for major contributors to climate
change and sea level rise would provide relief to financially strained federal
programs. It would remedy the issue that holding these actors liable does not fit
neatly into existing civil liability frameworks.232
225. See Canon, supra note 71.
226. See Stein, supra note 17.
227. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856–58 (9th Cir. 2012); id. at 867–
68 (Pro, J., concurring).
228. John Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Case Against Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/climate/exxon-climate-lawsuit-new-york.html?smid=nytcore-iosshare.
229. Lucy Rodgers, Climate Change: The Massive CO2 Emitter You May Not Know About, BBC NEWS
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-46455844.
230. Kampala Convention, supra note 193, art. 3, cl. 1(h)–(i).
231. Id. art. 3, cl. 2(a).
232. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
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Applying this aspect of the Kampala Convention to the U.S. framework for
EDPs would not only assist in relocation efforts, but would also help the United
States fulfill its obligation to provide compensation or reparations for
displacement related losses. While lawmakers will certainly face challenges in
crafting laws to hold corporate actors responsible, they might begin by targeting
those corporations whose actions have had a direct effect on the land in their
immediate vicinities of operation. In the Isle de Jean Charles example,
irresponsible dredging by nearby oil companies was a major contributor to the
loss of wetlands and “freshwater vegetation that held the land together.”233
Diamond, Louisiana, discussed above, provides another example.234 There,
Shell’s chemical leaks and explosions had a direct and immediate effect on the
habitability of the surrounding area.235 A path toward more expansive corporate
liability may begin with codifying liability in similar situations where there is
strong evidence of causation and tangible effects on local communities.
2. Existing Agencies and Economic Incentives for Relocation
As discussed above, a major aspect of any successful relocation is
implementing strategies to ensure that EDPs can successfully integrate into or
create new economies in their areas of relocation.236 In the USAID framework
for IDPs, this would likely fit into the long-term development phase.237 Longterm economic stability will not be achieved simply by buying out individual
homes or paying for the physical aspects of community relocation. It is not
enough, even for the select few homeowners who are offered FEMA buyouts,238
to be paid market value for their home, or to provide funding for the physical
relocation of a community without providing for the economic infrastructure to
sustain them in a new locale. These approaches do not account for the
employment situations and financial stability that EDPs leave behind when they
are displaced. In addition to the suggestions made above regarding livelihood
planning and the Green New Deal,239 there are a number of ways that the existing
framework of disaster relief agencies can assist with economic integration by
providing incentives.
For example, the SBA already offers loans to businesses following natural
disasters, regardless of whether the business sustained any physical damage, to
prepare the business for future disasters.240 The SBA could expand this incentive
to encourage businesses to move further inland, to open in localities where EDPs
are resettled, and to offer employment opportunities to EDPs. This could
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Stein, supra note 17.
See supra Part II.B.2.
Stein, supra note 17.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 177, at 3.
See Mach et al., supra note 55, at 2–6.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
Business Disaster Loans Program Description, supra note 85.
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stimulate economic activity for EDPs and alleviate one of the major challenges
of relocation. HUD could also have a hand in this economic stimulation. The
existing CDBG, which funds the rebuilding process in disaster affected areas,241
could be adjusted to offer similar services to communities that seek to
proactively relocate. HUD could offer employment opportunities to assist in the
construction and infrastructure projects required for relocation, rather than
simply responding to areas that have already been severely impacted. This would
both encourage inland retreat and stimulate the economies of struggling EDP
populations.
Adjusting FEMA’s role in environmental displacement may also prove
beneficial. It is an important first step that FEMA has publicly announced its
aim “to categorically shift the federal focus away from reactive disaster spending
and toward research-supported, proactive investment in community
resilience.”242 Still, even with this notable policy update and accompanying
funding, individuals cannot apply directly to FEMA for a buyout; rather, they
must wait for their locality to request a buyout, and then hope that the locality
chooses them as a recipient.243 Even more troubling is that studies show that
wealthy areas are much more likely to participate in buyout programs, partially
because the locality is responsible for twenty-five percent of the cost, and lowerincome areas are not always equipped to provide the funding.244 This serves to
perpetuate issues of economic inequality, especially as they relate to EDPs.
Considering the limited funding and resources that FEMA must spread
amongst an ever-growing number of disasters,245 it is essential that FEMA, or
any newly designated authority or agency, adopts a more proactive approach to
mitigating the effects of natural disasters and sea level rise. Studies show that
for “every $1 spent on hazard mitigation,” the nation can save “$6 in future
disaster costs.”246 Critical to a more proactive approach is incentivizing
individuals and communities to relocate before catastrophic sea level rise and
weather events ravage the area, using some of the strategies outlined above
through HUD and SBA. Increased funding from a codified liability framework
for private actors could strongly support such initiatives.
3. Proactive Centralized Agency or Authority
The Kampala Convention also suggests a policy solution to the issues
created by piecemeal relocation, either by individual buyouts or by progressive

241. See Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program, supra note 81.
242. See Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), supra note 51.
243. Press Release, supra note 48.
244. See Mach et al., supra note 55, at 3; Press Release, supra note 48.
245. See Canon, supra note 71. According to FEMA, “[i]t is important to note that many flooded properties
don’t qualify for a buyout, funding is limited and requests for funding may exceed available resources.” FEMA
Fact Sheet, supra note 52.
246. Canon, supra note 71.
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retreat at the individual’s own behest.247 As part of each state’s obligation to
assist IDPs to find sustainable solutions, the Kampala Convention suggests that
states “designate an authority or body” for the task and “[a]dopt . . . strategies
and policies on internal displacement at national and local levels.”248 This rather
intuitive directive actually carries with it some significant policy implications.
As discussed above, the responses of FEMA, HUD, and SBA are somewhat
disaggregated, inefficient, and reactive. Designating a centralized authority to
formulate policy and implement strategies for EDPs could be an effective way
to consolidate existing frameworks in order to use resources more efficiently and
expediently.249 The Denali Commission, discussed above in relation to
relocation efforts in Newtok, Alaska, provides a strong example for creating an
independent agency.250 The purpose behind its creation was to “provide critical
utilities, infrastructure, and economic support” in Alaska and to acknowledge
“the need for increased inter-agency cooperation and focus.”251 Similarly, a new
agency focused on the needs of EDPs could help to consolidate existing agency
efforts and allow for a more proactive focus on long-term, equitable economic
integration and infrastructure.
Creating a new agency or authority dedicated to the handling of EDPs
could remedy some of the accountability problems that occur when
responsibility is spread among multiple agencies and entities.252 A centralized
agency or authority could prioritize a proactive response to displacement,
encourage elective relocation for individuals and communities, and better
organize the responses of existing agencies such as FEMA, HUD, and SBA. This
authority could provide proactive analysis of potential vulnerabilities to coastal
communities and help establish local mechanisms to monitor risks on an
ongoing basis with both funding and expertise.253 This is consistent with
Implementation Guidelines suggestion to create an early monitoring system.254
The authority could also provide similar support in the planning and

247. See Hauer, supra note 2, at 322 (“When climate effects are integrated over long periods of time, it is
likely that a combination of press and pulse events will spur migration across pre-existing migration pathways,
leveraging established networks of social capital and kin networks in destination decisions.”) (citations omitted).
248. Kampala Convention, supra note 193, art. 3, cl. 2(b)–(c).
249. Amanda Levinson, Slouching Toward Bethlehem? US Policy Toward Internally Displaced Persons,
15 LBJ J. PUB. AFFS. 39, 43 (2003).
250. See Denali Commission Story, supra note 119; see also infra Part II.B.1.
251. See Denali Commission Story, supra note 119.
252. Id.; see also Levinson, supra note 249, at 43 (suggesting a centralized agency for IDPs in the United
States).
253. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission’s Adaptation Assistance Program
provides a strong template for local monitoring mechanisms. See San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission (BCDC), ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/
organizations/san-francisco-bay-conservation-and-development-commission-bcdc.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2021). “The Adaptation Assistance Program (AAP) is one part of the Commission’s Climate Change Program
and was developed to increase Bay Area local governments’ capacity for adaptation planning and implementing
adaptation strategies.” Id.
254. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 177, at 2.
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implementation of relocation initiatives to offer expertise and to ensure that
equitable considerations are addressed. A proactive agency could also encourage
better management of floodplains and supplement the efforts of the National
Flood Insurance Program.255 Finally, a new authority could establish
mechanisms to facilitate active participation of community members in the
relocation process, consistent with the Implementation Guidelines.256
4. Centralized Reporting
The directive to create a new authority would be well complemented by the
proposed Climate Displaced Persons Act’s suggestion that the executive branch
provide Congress with an annual report “on people displaced by extreme
weather, drought and sea level rise,” and that the State Department create a
Global Climate Resilience Strategy.257 Any such strategy should include
existing disaster response while providing additional support in planning and
implementation on a local level.
The Kampala Convention directs states to “assess . . . the needs and
vulnerabilities of internally displaced persons and of host communities.”258 To
consider the needs of marginalized communities in relocation programs, as well
as the infrastructural needs of the communities that will receive them,
information must first be made available about existing trends and inequities.
Centralized reporting and the study of relevant data would aid a new agency or
authority to effectively execute existing strategies for disaster relief and to
implement more proactive relocation strategies focused on retaining the essence
of displaced communities, in contrast to the piecemeal relocation described
above in Diamond, Louisiana.259
Furthermore, centralized reporting is essential to creating a more robust
understanding of the equity issues involved with buyout programs. As discussed
above, FEMA does not keep data on homeowner identity, making it challenging
to understand exactly how buyouts are affecting marginalized communities.260
A centralized reporting mechanism will allow for a more thoughtful, equitable
approach to the relocation process, on small and large scales. Additionally, to
maximize the utility of centralized reporting, any new agency or authority should
include a team of experts committed to studying the data and incorporating
equitable considerations into buyout and relocation projects.261 A thorough
understanding of existing data will be essential to creating successful strategies
going forward.
255. See supra Part II.A.4.
256. See IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES, supra note 177.
257. Kaufman, supra note 184.
258. Kampala Convention, supra note 193, art. 5, cl. 5.
259. See Stein, supra note 17.
260. Mach et al., supra note 55, at 6.
261. I thank my classmate, Allyssa Rose, for suggesting the creation of an environmental justice branch to
ensure equitable relocation.
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CONCLUSION
While localities and states need to adopt plans and funding for the growing
number of EDPs in the United States, in USAID’s own words, “the primary
responsibility for [the] welfare and protection [of IDPs] lies with the respective
governing authorities” of affected countries.262 The United States has a
responsibility to the growing number of domestic EDPs. Applying existing
frameworks for handling IDPs to disaster response and relocation initiatives
already underway will serve as a strong starting point for the United States to
develop an infrastructure to handle this massive problem and to provide EDPs
with the essential tools to successfully reintegrate into inland areas, away from
the ever-rising sea.
Given the inevitability of climate induced sea level rise, and the resulting
changes to coastal areas in the United States, it is absolutely essential that the
United States develop policies and infrastructural strategies to handle the
millions of people who will continue to be permanently displaced from their
homes and communities. The United States should be more proactive in its
approach to EDPs. It should create an agency dedicated to the protection and
treatment of EDPs that will centralize existing resources and disaster response.
Furthermore, the United States should codify liability for private actors who
have contributed to sea level rise and population displacement and provide
economic stimulus incentives to assist with the relocation and reintegration of
EDPs from coastal areas. These initiatives will make existing frameworks more
efficient and ensure that the United States meets its responsibilities to EDPs as
outlined in the U.N. Principles.
It remains for other scholars to explore what policies localities and states
should adopt to accommodate sea level rise and migration. Important work also
remains to address how fires and other natural disasters will contribute to the
policy needs of EDPs in the United States, and what pressures climate migration
will assert on the inland areas receiving EDPs.263 In California, annual fire
seasons have gotten progressively more destructive.264 Early in the 2020 fire
season, California had already broken the all-time record of 3.2 million acres
burned.265 According to the New York Times, some 28 million Americans are
likely to be affected by similar megafires in the coming decades.266 While this
Note has addressed relocation mostly in the context of progressive sea level rise,

262. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 172, at 1–4.
263. See Hauer, supra note 2, at 321 (“[U]nmitigated sea level rise is expected to reshape the U.S. population
distribution, potentially stressing landlocked areas unprepared to accommodate this wave of coastal
migrants . . . .”). For an interactive map showing anticipated climate-induced migration in the U.S., see Abrahm
Lustgarten, How Climate Migration Will Reshape America, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/15/magazine/climate-crisis-migration-america.html.
264. Priya Krishnakumar & Swetha Kannan, The Worst Fire Season Ever. Again., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15,
2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/california-fires-damage-climate-change-analysis/.
265. Id.
266. Lustgarten, supra note 263.
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EDPs from fires and other natural disasters will certainly require the same
treatment and consideration. This is especially true considering that an estimated
11 million Californians, one out of every four, lives in a fire-prone area.267
Scholarship is also emerging as to the impacts of EDPs immigrating to the
United States.268 Some suggest that the United States should approach the issue
of transborder EDPs from both a humanitarian and a national security
standpoint, planning ahead to protect cultural identity and to ensure the
expedient vetting of sudden influxes of EDPs from abroad following natural
disaster events.269 Finally, important work remains to establish international
consensus about the treatment of EDPs.270 Citing a “protection gap” for
transborder EDPs due to the limitations of the U.N. definition of a refugee,
scholar Jennifer Skinner suggests that the international community formally
establish the application of the U.N. Guiding Principles to EDPs who are
displaced internationally.271 These will remain important areas for study as our
understanding of the severity of the impacts of anthropogenic climate change
and sea levels continue to rise.

267. John W. Schoen & Jordan McDonald, Warming Climate, Population Sprawl Threaten California’s
Future with More Destructive Wildfires, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2020, 9:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/
11/09/why-californias-wildfires-are-going-to-get-worse.html.
268. Hauer, supra note 2, at 324 (“[I]t has been estimated that parts of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) could become uninhabitable by the end of the century, potentially spurring an exodus of 500 million
people.”) (citation omitted).
269. Emily Naser-Hall, Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Case of Environmentally Displaced Persons and
the Need for a Specific Protection Regime in the United States, 22 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 263, 294–95, 297
(2014).
270. See Jennifer Skinner, Comment, The State Responsibility in the Face of Environmentally Displaced
Persons, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 417, 430–32 (2014).
271. Id. at 418, 432.
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